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CISA 2030 Meets OT's Problem of Trust That Never Expires

On October 26, CISA published CISA 2030: Defend, Harden, Prevail, a strategy that commits the agency to work with operational technology owners and operators to modernize their environments, strengthen supply chain security and invest in encrypted, resilient infrastructure that keeps essential services running during a disruption. In announcing it, acting director Nick Anderson acknowledged that there is no guarantee a strong defense will eliminate intrusions.

That acknowledgment is the most important line in the strategy, because it shifts the goal from keeping attackers out to continuing to operate once they are in. A CyberScoop commentary by editor-in-chief Greg Otto published November 3 identifies the obstacle that goal will run into first: operational networks keep trusting devices, software and credentials long after the reason for that trust has expired.

What does CISA 2030 commit to?

The strategy is organized around three pillars, each with goals to be reached by 2030:

  • Defend: lead national cyber defense by integrating government, industry, state and local and international partners, including working with OT owners and operators to modernize OT environments and secure supply chains.
  • Harden: prioritize national infrastructure security by integrating intelligence into critical infrastructure security operations and focusing resources where the impact is greatest.
  • Prevail: mobilize national resilience through resilient communications and investment in encrypted, resilient infrastructure that maintains continuity during disruption.

According to CyberScoop, the agency has committed to define its implementation and outcome measurement approach within 180 days.

What is OT's blind trust problem?

Controllers in water plants, substations and pipelines routinely run for decades. Over that time, their firmware changes, their suppliers change, the people with access change and the networks around them change. The trust those devices extend rarely changes with them. A remote connection set up for a vendor project outlives the project, a password issued to a technician years ago still works, and a device continues to accept commands from any peer that can reach it because that was the design assumption when it was installed.

Otto puts the test plainly: if revoking one compromised credential would take down an essential service, the architecture has failed. By that standard, a large share of today's critical infrastructure fails, because credentials in OT are usually static, shared across devices and woven into processes that operators are afraid to touch.

Why does trust in OT go stale in the first place?

There are three structural reasons. First, changing a credential in OT has historically meant touching a running process, so operators avoid it. Second, PKI was never viable on most field devices, which lack the processing capacity, the connectivity to a certificate authority and the staff to manage certificate lifecycles, so the default became static passwords or no authentication at all. Third, as the commentary notes, device security, software assurance and identity management usually belong to different teams, and the failures happen in the gaps between them.

The consequences are not hypothetical. In the past two months, attackers have taken control of refrigeration controllers at hundreds of European supermarkets, and U.S. officials are investigating suspected attacks on freezers at military commissaries. In both cases the controllers acted on commands without verifying their source.

How should resilience be measured?

CISA's forthcoming outcome measures are an opportunity to make trust management measurable. We would suggest three questions that every critical infrastructure operator should be able to answer, and that a resilience metric should capture:

  • Can you see your trust relationships? Operators should be able to identify which devices, people and suppliers can command which systems, and on what basis.
  • Can you revoke trust without an outage? Removing a compromised device or credential should be a routine operation, not an emergency change that stops production.
  • Can you restore verified operation? After an intrusion, operators should be able to re-establish trust among the remaining devices and confirm that commands are coming from legitimate sources.

The commentary also recommends that federal buyers make these controls acceptance conditions, asking suppliers how they provision device identities, verify updates, retire credentials and recover from compromise. That is a sound place to start, because it moves trust management from an afterthought to a purchasing requirement.

Trust that expires by design

The durable fix is an architecture in which trust is short-lived by default. Autonomous Key Management™ delivers this to OT environments where PKI was never viable. AKM changes keys autonomously with every session, so there are no standing credentials to go stale or to steal. When a node is compromised, AKM can cut it off and roll new keys to the remaining devices without sending keys over the wire and without stopping operations, which is exactly the revocation test the commentary describes.

What should operators do now?

CISA 2030 sets the right ambition, and its acknowledgment that intrusions will happen is an honest starting point. Operators should not wait for the 180-day implementation plan to begin inventorying who and what their OT systems trust, identifying credentials that cannot be revoked without downtime, and requiring that new equipment support device-level authentication. Resilience in 2030 will depend on whether the trust built into today's infrastructure can be withdrawn on demand.

About AKMSecure

AKMSecure delivers a patented Autonomous Key Management™ protocol built to replace outdated PKI approaches with a dynamic, quantum-secure, air-gapped-capable architecture. Instead of relying on persistent credentials that can be stolen, reused, or abused, AKM enables independently verified sessions with no standing privileges left behind. The result is a model that better aligns with Zero Trust principles, reduces certificate-based risk, and supports resilient operations across enterprise IT, OT and Tactical Edge environments. Built to NSA-grade security standards and deployable as a lightweight SDK, AKMSecure helps organizations modernize trust at the protocol layer without rebuilding everything around it.

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